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Abstract
Admission-practices at high-prole universities are often criticized for undermining
academic merit. Popular tests for detecting such biases su¤er from omitted characteris-
tic bias. We develop a bounds-based test to circumvent this problem. We assume that
students that are better-qualied on observables would, on average, appear academ-
ically stronger to admission-tutors based on unobservables. This assumption reveals
the sign of di¤erences in admission-standards across demographic groups which are
robust to omitted characteristics. Applying our methods to admissions-data from a
British university, we nd higher admission standards for males and slightly higher
ones for private-school applicants, despite equal admission success-probability across
gender and school-background.
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1 Introduction
Admission practices at selective universities generate considerable public interest and politi-
cal controversy, due to their close connection with inter-generational mobility and social dis-
crimination. For example, in the UK a highly publicized 2011 Sutton Trust report shows that
nationally just 3% of schools mostly expensive and independent (as opposed to state-run)
institutions account for 32% of undergraduate admissions to Oxford and Cambridge, while
these universities claim to admit solely on the basis of academic merit. On the other hand,
background-based admission quotas such as caste-based reservation in India and race-based
a¢ rmative action in the US have generated intense public controversy. Despite signicant
public interest in these issues, rigorous methods for modelling and testing "fairness" of ad-
missions based on empirical evidence are absent in the academic literature. In this paper,
we develop an empirical framework to model meritocracy of admission decisions, and use it
to infer whether all applicants are held to the same academic standard during admissions.
A simple approach to detecting discrimination in admissions, popular in the education
literature, is to test if demographic or socioeconomic characteristics of applicants are signif-
icant determinants of admission, after controlling for commonly observed academic records
such as past test-scores (c.f., Espenshade et al, 2004, Zimdars et al, 2009, Hurwitz, 2011).
However, if admission o¢ cers observe more indices of academic ability than the researcher,
and the relation between observable and unobservable indices varies by demographics, then
these naive tests become invalid, c.f., Heckman, 1998. For instance, if female candidates
ceteris paribus perform better on interviews, and interview scores are unobserved by a re-
searcher, then equal admission rate of observationally similar male and female candidates
implies bias against female applicants. Indeed, in the empirical context investigated in the
present paper, we nd that socioeconomic backgrounds do not have statistically signicant
e¤ects on admission rates, once we control for pre-admission test and interview scores. How-
ever, applying a more careful analysis that addresses the omitted characteristic problem, we
nd that male candidates face a higher admission threshold than female candidates, and that
di¤erences in thresholds across type of school attended by the applicant is less signicant.
Beyond their obvious legal and political signicance, such ndings also have important
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policy implications. For example, knowing that one has to admit weaker female students to
maintain gender balance in application success rates raises questions about what investments
are needed at the school-level to improve the quality of female applicants. Naive satisfaction
with gender equality in admission success would conceal this important role for potential
interventions.
Methodologically, our approach to bias detection is related to the productivity based view
of optimal decisions, in the tradition of Becker (1957). Viewed in this light, if admissions
are purely meritocratic, then the marginal admitted student from a state-school should
be expected to perform equally well in post-admission assessments, e.g., college exams, as
the marginal admit from a private school. But her expected performance would be worse
under a¢ rmative action. Conversely, taste-based discrimination against state-schools will
lead to the marginal state-school admit to perform better than the marginal independent
school admit. The di¤erence between expected performances of marginal candidates across
demographic groups can therefore be interpreted as a measure of deviation from meritocracy.
A challenge in implementing this approach directly is that a researcher typically observes
a subset of the applicant characteristics used by admissions-tutors and the distributions of
the unobserved characteristics may and usually do di¤er across demographic groups. This
"omitted characteristics" problem jeopardizes the researchers attempt at reconstructing the
decision-makers perceptions and spotting who the marginal admits are and, therefore, as-
sessing whether the decision-maker acted in an academically unbiased way. Problems of
this type been recognized by previous researchers in the context of detecting taste-based
discrimination in hiring (c.f. Heckman, 1998). In the present paper, we devise a test for
meritocratic admissions based on the di¤erences in admission-thresholds faced by di¤er-
ent demographic groups which, under appropriate assumptions, is robust to the omitted
characteristics problem.
Specically, we construct an empirical, threshold-crossing model of admissions involving
observed applicant covariates and unobserved heterogeneity, i.e., applicant characteristics
observed by admission-tutors but unobserved by the researcher. In our model, academic
fairness corresponds to using identical thresholds of expected future performance across
applicants from di¤erent demographic groups. Our key assumption  for which we will
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provide supporting empirical evidence  is that students who are signicantly better in
terms of easily observable indicators of academic potential should statistically  but not
necessarily with certainty be more likely to appear stronger to the admission tutor, based on
characteristics observed by her but not by the researcher. The distribution of unobservables,
conditional on observables, is otherwise allowed to be arbitrarily di¤erent across demographic
groups. We show that using this assumption in conjunction with pre and post enrolment
data, one can learn about the sign of the di¤erences between admission thresholds applied
to di¤erent demographic groups.
We use our methods to analyze admissions data from a selective UK University on appli-
cants who have cleared an initial, exam-based elimination round. We rst provide evidence
in support of our identifying assumption; we then apply our methods to show that male ap-
plicants face a higher admission standard than females,1 whereas standards faced by private
school applicants are possibly slightly higher than those faced by state school applicants.
In contrast, the application success rates are very similar across gender and type of school
attended by the candidate, both before and after controlling for key covariates  thereby
illustrating the crux of our approach.
Literature: A large volume of research exists in educational statistics on the analysis of
admissions to selective colleges, focusing mainly on the United States (c.f. Hoxby, 2009). In
this context, our goal is to assess the extent of meritocracy in prevalent admission practice by
focusing on the marginal admits in di¤erent demographic groups. This enables us to demon-
strate empirically that equal success rate in admissions across demographic groups can be
consistent with very di¤erent admission standards across these di¤erent groups. See Sander,
2004, for an early discussion of these issues in the context of US law-school admissions. This
is in contrast to many other studies both academic and policy-oriented which compare
either average pre-admission test-scores (c.f. Herrnstein and Murray, 1994) or average post-
admission performance across all (as opposed to marginal) admitted students from di¤erent
1As a referee has pointed out, it remains possible that some academically stronger female
candidates were erroneously eliminated in the rst round; had they been retained, the gender
gap may have appeared narrower.
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socioeconomic groups (c.f. Keith et al., 1985, Sackett et al., 2009, Kane and William, 1998).
Our paper also complements an existing literature on analyzing the consequences of a¢ r-
mative actions in college admissions. Fryer and Loury (2005) provide a critical review of the
relevant theoretical literature. On the empirical side, Arcidiacono (2005) uses a structural
model of admissions to simulate the potential, counterfactual consequences of removing a¢ r-
mative action in US college admission; Card and Krueger (2005) describe the reduced-form
impact of eliminating a¢ rmative action on minority studentsapplication behavior in Califor-
nia; Hinrichs (2012) examines e¤ects of banning preferential admission policies on enrolment
patterns of both minority and non-minority students. Arcidiacono and Lovenheim (2015)
provide a review of the empirical evidence on the e¤ect of a¢ rmative action on student-
college mismatch. The present paper, though substantively related to the above works, has
a di¤erent goal , viz., here we construct a formal econometric model where a¢ rmative-action
(or taste-based discrimination) and meritocracy have di¤erent empirical implications, and
use it in conjunction with admissions-related micro-data to detect deviations from meritoc-
racy. To our knowledge, the only other work in this literature which focuses on marginal
admits is Bertrand et al (2010), who examined the consequences of a¢ rmative action in
admission to an Indian college. In their setting, admission was based on score in a single
entrance exam; admission thresholds di¤ered by applicantssocial caste and were publicly
announced. This set-up removes a key empirical challenge that of dening and identifying
the marginal admits and rejects arising in general admissions contexts where entrance is
based on several background variables, there is unobserved heterogeneity across applicants
and admission thresholds are not explicitly announced. Our context requires us to deal with
this more general scenario.
Although this paper focuses on the issue of college admissions, the general methodology is
applicable to many other settings of testing bias in institutional decision-making. Common
examples include approval of business loan and mortgage applications, referrals to expensive
surgery vis-a-vis cheaper medicine-based treatment, and hiring decisions. The data setting
is one where a researcher has access to key characteristics of individual applicants, and the
eventual decision made on their behalf by the approval agency. These "key" characteristics
need not be exhaustive, and the present papers methodology allows for the possibility that
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approvers may observe a richer set of applicant characteristics than the researcher. Applying
our methods one can then test whether the observed data are consistent with meritocratic
approval processes, e.g., that all loan applicants face a common ceiling of default probability
below which the application is approved, or that each patient has to clear the same hurdle
of expected survival days following the surgery in order to qualify for the procedure.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 sets up a simple theoretical
model, followed by the corresponding empirical model of meritocratic admissions; Section 3
describes the data. Section 4 states the assumptions, provides empirical evidence in support
of the key identifying assumption, and lays out the identication analysis. Section 5 discusses
inference. Section 6 reports the empirical ndings from the real dataset, presents robustness
checks and discusses some caveats. Section 7 concludes. An online Appendix contains the
basic economic model of optimal admissions (part A), some additional gures and tables
relevant to robustness checks (B.1 and B.2), the result of a simulation exercise based on
the real data (part B.3), and formuale for calculating the condence intervals for threshold
di¤erences (part C).
2 Benchmark Optimization Model
In the online appendix, part A, we lay out a benchmark economic model of admissions to
help x ideas. Based on this economic model, we will develop a corresponding econometric
model incorporating unobserved heterogeneity, which can be taken to admissions data. The
basic elements of the economic model are as follows.
Let W denote an applicants pre-admission characteristics, observed by the university.
Let  (w) denote a w-type students expected outcome (e.g., expected future GPA) if he/she
enrols; and let  (w) denote the probability that a w-type student upon being o¤ered admis-
sion eventually enrols. Let c 2 (0; 1) be be the fraction of applicants who can be admitted,
given the number of available spaces. If the university wishes to maximize total perfor-
mance of the incoming cohort subject to the restriction on the number of vacant places,
then its admission strategy would be to admit those individuals whose  (w)  , where
 is chosen to satisfy the budget constraint. The key feature of the above rule is that 
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does not depend on covariates, and so the value of an applicants W a¤ects the decision on
his/her application only through its e¤ect on  (W ). To get some intuition on this, con-
sider the case where one of the covariates in W is gender and assume that the admission
threshold for women, female, is strictly lower than that for men, male. Then the marginal
female, admitted with w = (x; female), contributes female   (x; female) to the expected
aggregate outcome and takes up  (x; female) places, implying a contribution of female
(=  (x; female) female= (x; female)) to the objective of average realized outcome. Simi-
larly, the marginal rejected male, if admitted, would contribute male to the average outcome.
Since male > female we can increase the average outcome if we replaced the marginal female
admit with the marginal male reject. Thus di¤erent thresholds cannot be consistent with
the objective of maximizing the overall outcome. Our goal is to use actual admissions data
to understand whether admission o¢ cers use identical thresholds across socio-demographic
groups. The key challenge is to allow for the possibility that admission-tutors inference
about academic merit were based on more characteristics than the researchers observe, so
that one cannot infer the admission thresholds simply based on observed characteristics.
Therefore, we now turn to the task of constructing an econometric model incorporating
unobserved heterogeneity in an empirical model of admissions.
2.1 Econometric Model
To set up the empirical framework, let W := (X;G), where G denotes one or more discrete
components of W capturing the group identity of the applicant (such as sex, race or type
of high school attended) which forms the basis of commonly alleged mistreatment. The
variables in X are the applicants other characteristics observed prior to admission which
include one or more continuously distributed components like standardized test-scores. We
observe the covariates X;G and the binary admission outcome D (= 1 if admitted, and = 0
otherwise). Let Xg, Xh denote the support of X for applicants of type G = g and G = h,
respectively.
Now, let Z denote an index of academic ability of applicants, based on "soft" characteris-
tics, such as evidence of enthusiasm, academic reference letters, etc., which are unobservable
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to the analyst but observed by the admission-tutor. This may also include any random
idiosyncrasies in the tutorsexpectation formation process.2 We assume that larger values
of Z, without loss of generality, denote higher perceived academic potential.
Under meritocratic admissions, admission tutors would decide on whether to admit appli-
cant i in the current year, based on  (Xi; Gi; Zi), their subjective assessment of is academic
merit, e.g., how applicant i will perform when admitted.3 In accordance with our economic
model, we assume that an applicant i with Gi = g, Zi = z and Xi = x 2 Xg is o¤ered
admission (i.e., Di = 1) if and only if  (x; g; z)  , where  denotes the university-wide
baseline threshold for applicants. That is,
Di =
8<: 1 if  (Xi; Gi; Zi)  ;0 otherwise. (1)
An admission practice is academically fair if and only if  does not vary by demographics.
The underlying intuition is that the only way covariates G should inuence the admission
process is through their e¤ect on the perceived academic merit. Having a larger  for, say,
females than males implies that a male applicant with the same expected outcome as a
female applicant is more likely to be admitted. Conversely, under a¢ rmative action type
policies,  will be lower for those demographics which represent historically disadvantaged
groups. Therefore, we are interested in testing whether the values of the threshold  are
identical across demographics. We will call  the "admission threshold".
Thus in our set-up, a female applicant with identical X as a male candidate can have
a higher probability of being admitted and yet the admission process may be academically
fair if females have a higher expected performance than males with identical X. This notion
of fairness di¤ers from one which requires that individuals who are identical on publicly
veriable variables (i.e., the Xs) must have equal chances of getting in, no matter what their
value of G and no matter whether predicted future performance di¤ers across G for the same
value of X.
2When there are multiple sources of soft information, Z may be interpreted as a composite
scalar index, e.g., a weighted average, of these characteristics.
3In line with the existing literature on bias-detection referenced above, we ignore issues
about risk.and leave that for future research.
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Remark 1 It is important to note that we do not assume that tutors literally calculate
expected future performance in order to admit candidates. Our goal is to assess whether the
admission process, whatever its goal and however it is conducted, is consistent with the goal
of admitting the academically strongest applicants.
3 Data
Our empirical analysis is based on admissions data for two recent cohorts of applicants to
a competitive and popular undergraduate degree programme at a selective UK University.
Students enter British universities to study a specic subject, rather than the US model
of starting a general curriculum, followed by specialization in later years. Consequently,
admissions are conducted primarily by faculty members (i.e., admission tutors) in the specic
discipline to which the candidate has applied. An applicant competes with all others who
apply to this specic subject and no switches are permitted across disciplines in later years.
The admission process is held to be strictly academic where extra-curricular achievements are
given no weight. In that sense, these admissions are more comparable with Ph.D. admissions
in US universities. Furthermore, almost all UK applicants sit two common school-leaving
examinations, viz., the GCSE and the A-levels before entering university. Each of these
examinations requires the student to take written tests in specic subjects. The examinations
are centrally conducted, and so the scores of individual students are directly comparable. In
addition, all applicants take a multiple-choice aptitude test, similar to the SAT in the US,
and write an essay that is graded.
Choice of sample: For our empirical analysis, we will focus on UK-domiciled applicants.
The application process consists of an initial stage whereby a standardized "UCAS" form is
lled by the applicant and submitted to the university. This form contains the applicants
unique identier number, gender, school type, prior academic performance record, personal
statement and a letter of reference from the school. The GCSE, the aptitude-test and
essay scores are separately recorded. About one-third of all applicants are then selected
for interview by admission tutors on the basis of the aptitude test and the rest rejected.
Selected candidates are then assessed via a face-to-face interview and the interview scores
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are recorded centrally. This sub-group of applicants who have been called to interview will
constitute our sample of interest. Therefore, we are in e¤ect testing the academic e¢ ciency
of the second round of the selection process, taking the rst round as given. Accordingly,
from now on, we will refer to those summoned for interview as the applicants. The nal
admission decision is made by considering all candidate-specic information from among the
applicants called for interviews. For our application, we use anonymized data for two cohorts
of applicants from their records held at the central admissions database at the university.
To preserve anonymity, the data do not contain reference letters.
Choice of covariates: We chose a preliminary set of potential covariates to be the
observables, based on the information recorded on UCAS forms and the universitys ap-
plication records. We use as observable components (i.e., X) GCSE score, aptitude test
scores, the examination essay-score and the interview score. A more detailed description of
these covariates is provided in Table 0, below. The unobservable index of achievement Z
pertains to information conveyed by recommendation letters. Given that those summoned
for interview constitute our "population" of interest, we found that in terms of whether the
applicant previously read two subjects recommended for entry, there is very little variation
across these applicants and including these covariates makes no di¤erence to our eventual
results. Therefore, we eventually dropped these variables from the analysis.
Group identities G: We consider academic e¢ ciency of admissions with regards to two
di¤erent group identities, viz., type of school attended by the applicant and the applicants
gender. Selective universities in the UK are frequently criticized for the relatively high
proportion of privately-educated students admitted. The implication is that applicants from
independent schools, where spending per student is very much higher than in state schools
(Graddy and Stevens, 2005), have an unfair advantage in the admission process. This is of
special concern in a country like the UK where most selective universities are largely funded
by the taxpayer. The issue of gender di¤erences in admission and academic performance
is, of course, a more universal issue. In the UK, as in most OECD countries, the higher
education participation rate is higher for women, having overtaken that for men in 1993.
However, selective universities in the UK have lagged behind the trend: in 2010-11, 55% of
undergraduates across all UK universities were female, but 44% of students admitted to the
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university we are analyzing were female. Typically, gender imbalances are more pronounced
in certain programmes and includes the one we study, where male enrolment is nearly twice
the female enrolment.
In our dataset, we can also match the post-admission academic performance of admitted
students to their pre-admission characteristics. In principle, one can use this information
for analyzing potential bias in admissions. Allowing for selection on unobservables, however,
means that such data cannot be used without making more restrictive assumptions. For
example, a regression of eventual academic performance on pre-admission covariates for
admitted candidates does not yield a consistent estimate of the predictive power of these
covariates for the pool of applicants, for whom the admission decision is made. Indeed,
due to classical selection bias, one would expect such e¤ects to be biased toward zero (c.f.,
Rothstein, 2004 for discussion of related issues). A second potential limitation of such data
is that academic performance as measured by the universitys own exams may not be the
sole index of academic ability sought by an admission-tutor. They might focus instead on a
subjective measure of academic ability which may only be positively correlated with eventual
performance in university exams. For these reasons, we did not include these data in our
main analysis. Nonetheless, while interpreting our empirical results, we use these predictive
regressions (see Fig. 3 and 6 below) as suggestive evidence of where our results might have
arisen from.
4 Assumptions
In order to develop a test of meritocratic admissions, which can be applied to the above data,
we will make a set of assumptions using the following notation. For any pair of individuals
i and j, where i is of type g and has a value of X equal to xg and j is of type h and has
X = xh with xg 2 Xg and xh 2 Xh, the notation xg " xh will mean that applicants i and
j are identical with respect to all qualitative attributes and, moreover, every continuously-
distributed component of xg is at least " standard deviations larger than the corresponding
component of xh. For example, if G = school typeand X = (SAT;GPA;male), then xg "
xh means that applicant i and j are both male or both female and that SATi > SATj+"SAT
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and GPAi > GPAj + "GPA, where, GPA and SAT are the standard deviation of GPA and
SAT for the entire population of applicants. We will denote by Q (ZjA) the th quantile of
the random variable Z given the random variable A.
Throughout the rest of the paper, we will maintain the following assumption:
Assumption M (Median restriction) (i) There exists " > 0 such that for any e  ", if
xg 2 Xg and xh 2 Xh and xg e xh, then,
Median [ZjX = xg; G = g]  Median [ZjX = xh; G = h] ;
for any g and h; (ii)  (Xi; Gi; Zi) (introduced just before equation (1)) is continuously
distributed conditionally on any realization of (Xi; Gi).
A stronger version of Assumption M is rst-order stochastic dominance, which has the
same intuitive interpretation as Assumption M (see immediately below):
Assumption SD (Stochastic Dominance) There exists " > 0 such that for any e  ", if
xg 2 Xg and xh 2 Xh with xg e xh, then the distribution of Z conditional on X = xg,
G = g rst order stochastic dominates that of Z conditional on X = xh, G = h:
Pr [Z  ajX = xg; G = g]  Pr [Z  ajX = xh; G = h] ;
for any a and for all g; h; (ii)  (Xi; Gi; Zi) is continuously distributed conditionally on
any realization of (Xi; Gi).
Discussion: Crudely speaking, Assumption M/SD means that applicants who are better
along standard, observable indicators of academic ability are also likely to be better "on
average" in terms of the index of unobserved characteristics which the tutors weigh pos-
itively in determining admissions. The motivation for this assumption comes from the fact
that for meritocratic admissions, the outcome of interest may be thought of as a measure of
future academic performance whereas the measures in X are a set of past academic perfor-
mance in high-school or admissions-related assessments. It is therefore likely that candidates
who have performed signicantly better in past assessments are statistically more likely to
have performed better in those assessments (unobserved by the researcher) which admission
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tutors view as positive determinants of future performance and hence, under the assumption
of being academically motivated, would weigh positively in the decision to admit. While
assumption M/SD is likely to hold for the population of all students, some of this positive
dependence may be partially eroded for the population of applicants if the decision to apply
depends on unobservables. Indeed, if applications are costly and a student applies despite
having low scores on observable tests, she is likely to be stronger on unobservable attributes
relative to the average student with low observable test-scores in the population. Such se-
lective application will reduce the extent of positive dependence between observables and
unobservables among the applicants relative to that in the population of all students. We
address this concern below by providing evidence which strongly suggests that the aggregate
impact of such "erosion" on the positive dependence is likely insignicant.
The magnitude of " controls the strength of Assumption M. Thus " = 0 corresponds to
the benchmark case where we are comparing a pair of g and h type applicants, such that
the former has scored higher in each previous assessment than the latter. A strictly positive
" leads to comparison of applicant-pairs with no overlap of pre-admission test-scores. The
higher is ", the more likely are assumptions M or SD to hold, but the lower will be the power
of our test, since fewer pairs of students will satisfy M/SD with a higher ". A practical
method for choosing " in an application is suggested below.
Note also that assumption M is substantively much weaker than two informal arguments
often used in applied work viz., (i) when the distribution of the observable covariates are
balanced across treatment and control groups in quasi-experimental designs, it is taken to
imply that they are also balanced in terms of unobservables (e.g., Greenstone and Gayer,
2009) and (ii) orthogonality of an instrument with observed covariates is taken as suggestive
evidence that it is orthogonal with unobserved covariates (e.g., Angrist and Evans, 1998, p.
458). In our context, the type of variables typically unobservable to researchers but likely to
a¤ect admissions include achievements such as winning special academic prizes, participation
in science or math olympiads, high intellectual enthusiasm conveyed by applicantspersonal
essays and the subjective impressions of previous teachers implied via reference letters. Such
specic information can identify individual applicants and therefore are most likely to be
withheld from researchers owing to privacy considerations. However, while making admis-
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sion decisions, tutors are likely to observe these characteristics for current applicants via
their dossiers or through personal interactions. It is intuitive that such achievements are
statistically more likely to have occurred for individuals who score higher in terms of easily
observable entrance assessments and aptitude tests than those who score lower.
Finally, the continuity condition in Assumption M (ii) rules out "gaps" in the distribution
of Z, which helps to relate the probability of admission to the admission thresholds. Such
continuity is intuitive, especially when Z is a function of several underlying performance
indicators which are themselves continuously distributed.
Remark 2 Note that assumption M/SD does not say that applicants with higher X have
higher Z with probability one; it simply says that their values of Z tend to be higher in a
stochastic sense.
Remark 3 The restriction on the median cannot be replaced by a restriction on the condi-
tional expectation for identication purpose since we are considering a discrete-choice prob-
lem, viz., D = 1f (X;G;Z)  Gg. See Manski (1975) for why a conditional quantile
restriction is necessary for the identication of discrete-choice models.
Remark 4 Assumption M allows the distribution of the unobservable Z to di¤er by back-
ground variables; in particular, we allow both the location as well as the scale of Z to depend
on G (conditional on X) and thus also allow for the realistic situation of larger uncertainty
regarding applicants from historically under-represented communities.
Empirical evidence of median-dominance: Among the pre-admission variables that
we observe in our dataset, only the score on the interview is assigned by tutors. This is
the type of variable most likely to be missing in other datasets since they reect subjective
assessment by the admission-tutors. We will rst check our Assumption M for the applicants
in our data by treating the interview score as the unobservable component. That is, we will
verify whether the median interview score is higher for those types of applicants who are
better in terms of all other "tutor-independent" test-scores X obtained in prior assessments.
If applications are costly, a student with low scores on X will apply only if her potential
performance on the interview is likely to be high, so that an applicant with low X is likely
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to be stronger on interview-skills relative to the average student with low X. The question
is whether this negative relationship is strong enough to override the overall positive rela-
tionship in the population. Since the interview score is observed for the entire sample, we
can test this hypothesis.4 The concrete steps leading to our test are as follows. Consider
X =(GCSEscore, Aptitude_test_score, Exam_essay). First, run a median regression of
interview score (which now plays the role of Z) on X and quadratics in components of X
plus G, where G represents gender or school-type, and compute the predicted values. These
represent Median[ZjX;G]. We then compare these predicted values for pairs of applicants
where the rst applicant is of type G = g and the second applicant is of type G = h. In
Figure 1, we depict histograms capturing the marginal distribution of the conditional median
di¤erences, for di¤erent combinations of g and h. The analog of our Assumption M here
is that these histograms should have an entirely positive support, up to estimation error.
For example, the histogram in the top left panel of Figure 1 shows the estimated marginal
distribution of the variable
Median[interview j Xg; g = male] Median[interview j Xh; h = female]
across all paired realizations (Xg; Xh) satisfying Xg " Xh. We choose " = 0:0; if we
demonstrate median dominance for " = 0:0, then dominance will obviously hold for all
higher values of ".
It is evident that all four of these histograms have entirely positive support, suggesting
that the median dominance conditions hold even for " = 0. In the appendix, we also show
analogous histograms for the 25th and 75th quantiles with " = 0:0. There is overwhelming
evidence that these histograms also have positive support and thus that the stronger SD
condition is also likely to be true. As a second piece of evidence, we calculate the correlation
matrix among the various indicators of academic merit at the pre-admission stage. These
are reported in the online appendix, from where it is evident that all correlations are strictly
4Since we use only those applicants who were summoned for interview, there is an ad-
ditional level of selection which can further weaken the correlation between unobservables
and observables. Our "test" (c.f. Fig. 2, below) therefore assesses the extent of correlation
remaining after both levels of selection.
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positive, which lends further support to assumption M/SD.
The evidence presented above is of course suggestive, rather than denitive. Indeed, if
we had found a negative or no relation between the interview score and the observable test-
scores, our assumption M would be suspect. The point of the above graph and tables is to
show that this is not the case.
Our next assumption relates to the structure of the  function.
Assumption CM (Conditional Monotonicity) (i)  (x; g; z) is strictly increasing in z
for every x and g; (ii) if xg and xh satisfy xg " xh, then  (xg; g; z) >  (xh; h; z) for
any z, and any g 6= h.
Discussion: Part (i) of Assumption CM is essentially denitional (regarding Z) in that
higher values of the index of ability based on unobserved characteristics are associated with
higher values of the perceived expected outcome. Part (ii) says that if a g-type applicant
is better than an h-type applicant along a set of key observable characteristics and is at
least equally good along the ability index which is unobservable to us but observable to
the decision-makers, then the g-type applicant will be perceived to have a higher expected
outcome by the decision-maker. It is important for part (ii) that the g-type applicant is
at least as good as the h-type applicant along the index Z. For instance, suppose that
admission tutors base their assessment on past exams whose scores X are observed by us
and the quality of the reference letter Z, unobserved by us. Then a female candidate who
has scored lower on every component of X than a male candidate but has a much better
recommendation may or may not be perceived as having a lower potential than the male
candidate. But a female candidate who has an equally strong recommendation Z as a male
candidate but has scored lower on every X than him will likely be perceived to have lower
academic potential in expectation. A su¢ cient but not necessary condition for CM(ii) to
hold is that (a)  (x; g; z) =  (x; h; z)   (x; z) for all x; z for any g 6= h, i.e., conditional
on the observable X and unobservable Z, the demographic characteristic G does not a¤ect
the outcome of interest, and, furthermore, (b)  (x; z)   (x0; z) if x " x0.
As a referee has pointed out, there is some evidence from the US state of California that
females with lower SAT scores and high-school GPA than males have performed systemat-
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ically better in college examinations (c.f. Leonard and Jiang, 1999, Rothstein, 2004). This
does seem somewhat unlikely in our application, given Figure 1 above and Figure 3, below.
Nonetheless, for the sake of robustness in our empirical application, we consider a variant
of assumption CM where instead of the raw scores Xg and Xh, we use their standardized
versions. That is, for group g, each performance measure Xg is taken not to be the raw
score, but as Xcong 
 
raw_score  g

=g, where g and g are the mean and standard
deviation of the raw score within group g. Accordingly, the condition Xconmale  Xconfemale
refers to those male-female pairs where the males have higher relative scores than females,
i.e., Xmale male
male
 Xfemale female
female
+ . Then the contextual version of assumption CM (ii) is
given by
Assumption CM(Conditional Contextual Monotonicity) (i)  (X; g; z)   (Xcon; g; z),
for all g; z; the function  (xcon; g; z) is strictly increasing in z for every xcon and g;5
(ii) if xcong and x
con
h satisfy x
con
g  xconh , then 
 
xcong ; g; z

>  (xconh ; h; z) for any z,
and any g 6= h.
This assumption means that candidates whose performances are in the top echelons of
their own socio-demographic group, will be perceived to be academically stronger. It thus
allows for "biased" performance measures, e.g., that female applicants with lower raw scores
on pre-entry evaluations may perform better in college exams, on average, and may therefore
be favoured by admission o¢ cers over males with higher initial scores. In our empirical work,
we will report the results using both the raw and the standardized scores to compare pairs
of applicants.
Choice of ": A practical way of choosing " is to draw histograms based on observables
like Figure 1 for a range of values of " and then choose the smallest value for which the
corresponding histograms have entirely positive support. In the application reported below,
we report results for " = 0:1 and " = 0:25 to ensure that there is no overlap in observable
5Part (i) of this assumption is identical to CM(i), since one can always rewrite  (x; g; z) =

 
g + gx
con; g; z
   (xcon; g; z) with the monotonicity of  (x; g; z) in x carrying over to
monotonicity of  (xcon; g; z) in xcon.
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characteristics between the pairs of students compared. Indeed, from Figure 1, it is obvious
that any value of " larger than 0 should be acceptable for this application. We also provide
some robustness check by reporting results over a range of " in Figure 7, below.
4.1 Identication Analysis
We show how assumption M/SD and CM can be used to identify the sign of threshold
di¤erences. To see this, denote the threshold used for type g and type h applicants by
g and h, respectively. Under meritocratic admissions, one expects g = h. Dene the
function
p (x; g) : = Pr [D = 1jX = x;G = g]
: = Pr

 (X;G;Z) > gjX = xg; G = g

;
and the setM (g; h; ") as
M(g; h; ") := f(xg; xh) 2 Xg Xh : xg " xh; p (xg; g)  0:5 < p (xh; h)g : (2)
Note that the set M (g; h; ") can be directly computed from the data because it depends
only on observables.
Now, suppose that one nds that M (g; h; ") is non-empty. Then, for any (xg; xh) in
M (g; h; "), since p (xg; g) = Pr

 (xg; g; Z) > gjxg; g
  0:5, it must be true that
g  Median [ (X;G;Z) jX = xg; G = g]
=  (xg; g;Median [Zjxg; g]) , by assumption CM(i)
>  (xh; h;Median [Zjxg; g]) , by CM(ii)
  (xh; h;Median [Zjxh; h]) , by assumption M
= Median [ (X;G;Z) jX = xh; G = h] , by CM(i)
 h, since 0:5 < p (xh; h) .
Thus, the non-emptiness of the setM (g; h; ") leads to the inequality g > h.
Under the stronger SD assumption, non-emptiness of the set
SD(g; h; ") := f(xg; xh) 2 Xg Xh : xg " xh; p (xg; g) < p (xh; h)g (3)
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would analogously imply that g > h. This is because if (xg; xh) 2 SD (g; h; "), then because
1  p (xg; g) = Pr

 (X;G;Z) < gjX = xg; G = g
	
, we have that
g = Q
1 p(xg ;g) [ (X;G;Z) jX = xg; G = g]
= 
 
xg; g;Q
1 p(xg ;g) [Zjxg; g]

, since  (xg; g; ) is increasing
> 
 
xg; g;Q
1 p(xh;h) [Zjxg; g]

, since p (xg; g) < p (xh; h)
   xg; g;Q1 p(xh;h) [Zjxh; h] , by assumption SD since xg " xh
   xh; h;Q1 p(xh;h) [Zjxh; h] , by assumption CM(ii) since xg " xh
= Q1 p(xh;h) f (xh; h; Z) jxh; hg , since  (xh; h; ) is increasing
 h,
since
1  p (xh; h) = Pr f (X;G;Z) < hjX = xh; G = hg .
Intuitively speaking, here the identication-relevant information comes from those pairs
of g-type and h-type applicants for whom the dominance condition xg " xh holds and yet
the g-types probability of being accepted is lower. Assumption M (or SD) guarantees that
these g-type applicants are also better, in a stochastic sense, in terms of unobservables. Note
that these identifying pairs include applicants who are close to each other (albeit at least
" standard deviations apart) in terms of observables and also those that are farther apart.
Also when g h > 0, it must be the case that SD (h; g; ") is empty. Therefore, if one nds
that SD (g; h; ") is empty, then one may test if SD (h; g; ") is non-empty. If so, then one can
conclude that g < h.
Remark 5 The logical structure of our analysis is that if SSD (g; h; ") is nonempty, then we
can conclude that g > h. But it is possible that although g > h, we nd that S
SD (g; h; ")
is empty. This is a generic feature of any analysis based on partially identied parameters:
they must be conclusive in fewer instances, compared to when model parameters are point-
identied. In other words, the cost of allowing for unobservables is that we may lose the ability
to detect very small but positive threshold di¤erences, but when we detect a di¤erence, we
can be certain about its existence. Indeed, without our proposed methods and the underlying
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assumptions justifying them, one cannot in general detect any threshold di¤erence however
large they might be.
Alternative Identication Strategies: The above methodology may be contrasted
with some alternative strategies proposed in the literature in non-educational contexts. For
instance, in the context of healthcare, Chandra and Staiger (2009) attempt to identify dif-
ference in expected outcome thresholds for surgery by assuming an index restriction on the
unobservables distribution. This approach fails when the distribution of the unobservables
di¤ers across G, conditional on observables. Our analysis imposes no such restriction on
the unobservablesdistribution. In the healthcare context, Bhattacharya (2013) suggests an
alternative approach to testing treatment bias using a combination of observational data and
prior experimental ndings from randomized controlled trials. Such experimental data are
di¢ cult to come by for college admissions. In law-enforcement contexts, several researchers
have relied on the assumption that target individuals react optimally to treatment protocols,
and devised methods to detect racial prejudice using this (c.f. Persico, 2009). However, these
approaches rely on the specics of the context and do not generalize to situations involving
university admissions. For example, it is both di¢ cult for university-applicants to alter their
potential academic outcomes in response to admission protocols and impractical for them to
want to do this, given the one-shot nature of admission exercise.
5 Estimation and Inference
Given the identication analysis above, our next task is to develop a formal inference method
for testing threshold-di¤erences. For this purpose, we will make the stronger assumption of
SD, rather than M. Indeed, these two assumptions have the same intuitive interpretation;
the evidence for SD (see section 6 and also part B of the Appendix) is strong and conducting
statistical inference under it is slightly simpler.
The key task regarding inference corresponding to Assumptions SD and CM is to test
whether SD (g; h; ") dened in equation (3), viz.,
SD(g; h; ") := f(xg; xh) 2 Xg Xh : xg " xh; p (xg; g) < p (xh; h)g
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is nonempty. Observe that the null hypothesis of an empty SD (g; h; ") is equivalent to the
hypothesis that 0  0, where
0 := inf
(xg ;xh)2XgXh; xg"xh
[p (xg; g)  p (xh; h)] .
We will now outline how to test the emptiness of SD (g; h; "), based on an inference
method developed for "intersection bounds" by CLR (2013). Although our identication
method is nonparametric in the sense of not requiring functional form specications, esti-
mation and inference for the nonparametric case is complicated. Due to relatively small
sample-size, the two-sample nature of the problem and the complicated construction of "in-
tersection bounds" for nonparametric estimates (requiring subjective choice of various tuning
parameters), we do not consider such methods here. Instead, we focus on the case where
p (; ) is parametrically specied as a probit. That is,
p (xg; g) = Pr [D = 1j (X;G) = (xg; g)] = 
 
x0g0;g

; and p (xh; h) =  (x0h0;h) ;
where (0;g; 0;h) are the probit coe¢ cients; and  is the C.D.F. of the standard normal. Note
that under our parametric specication, (x0gg)  (x0hh) is equivalent to x0gg  x0hh
and thus
SD (g; h; ") = xg " xh; x0g0;g  x0h0;h	 ;
and thus emptiness of SD (g; h; ") is equivalent to the hypothesis that 0  0, where
0 := inf
(xg ;xh)2XgXh; xg"xh

x0g0;g   x0h0;h

.
The quantity 0 is exactly of the form analyzed in CLR (2013). We construct a one-sided
95% condence interval C^n (0:95) =

 1; ^n0 (0:95)

for 0 by adapting the CLR method,
as outlined in part C of the Appendix, for each choice of g and h. If ^n0 (0:95) < 0, then we
conclude that SD (g; h; ") is non-empty.
6 Empirical Analysis
Summary statistics: We provide summary statistics for our sample in Table 1. The left half
of table 1 shows that male applicants have better aptitude test scores and interview averages.
	
				


618
 
!"

##$
%%&'(")"*%%
+
# 
	 
,#
'
	 #%+
They perform slightly worse on average in their GCSE and A-levels. These di¤erences are
statistically signicant at the 5% level. Note that there is no signicant di¤erence in o¤er
rates between male and female candidates. The independent and state school applicants
are quite similar in terms of most characteristics except for a slightly higher GCSE for the
former.
In Table 2 we report the results of a probit regression of receiving an o¤er across all
applicants. Table 2 strengthens the ndings from Table 1 by showing that even after con-
trolling for covariates, gender and school-type do not a¤ect the average admission-success
rate among applicants. The value of McFaddens pseudo-R2 for the probit model is about
50% and the corresponding R2 for a linear probability model (not reported here) is about
45% which are about 10 times higher than the goodness-of-t measures typically reported
by applied researchers working with cross-sectional data. This suggests that the commonly
observed covariates explain a very large fraction of admission outcomes. Moreover, Table 2
also shows that the aptitude test and interview scores have the largest impact upon receiving
an o¤er for the applicant population (in terms of the t-statistics).
6.1 Results
We rst conducted a simulation exercise, reported in the online appendix part B.3, using
these data, to check if our methods work well in a setting where we "know" the true admission
criteria. In that exercise we nd that medium sized di¤erences in admission thresholds are
picked up by our method and very small di¤erences are not, which increases our condence
that the methods work well in practice. Now, we turn to the real application where we use
the gcsescore, aptitude test score, and the interview score as the covariates X for dening
dominance. That is, if a g-type candidate has scored " standard deviations higher on each of
these three key assessment scores than an h-type candidate, then the conditional distribution
(or median) of the unobservable component of assessment for the former is assumed to
dominate that for the latter for all g and h, as per Assumption M or SD above.
In accordance with the discussion in Section 5, the rst step is to examine emptiness of
SD (g; h; ") using data on only X and D. We rst investigate this graphically in Figure 2 by
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plotting the marginal C.D.F. of the di¤erence in admission probabilities p (Xg; g)  p (Xh; h)
for pairs of (Xg; Xh) satisfying Xg " Xh for " = 0:1 for various combinations of g and h.
The predicted probabilities p (; ) are calculated separately for each group g, via standard
probit using gcsescore, aptitude test score, the examination essay score and the interview
score as regressors. Since we concluded dominance with " = 0:0, with Z being the interview
score, we chose a slightly higher (i.e., more conservative) value of " = 0:1 to investigate
emptiness of SD (g; h; "). When the event fXg " Xhg happens with positive probability,
an empty SD (g; h; ") is equivalent to Pr [Xg " Xh; p (Xg; g) < p (Xh; h)] = 0, where the
probability is taken with respect to the distributions of Xg and Xh. Therefore, a positive
mass at and below zero for these C.D.F.s indicates that SD (g; h; ") is nonempty. In the left
panel, when g = male, h = female, the C.D.F. is represented by the solid curve labelled
male_fem; and when g = female and h = male, it is the dashed curve, labelled fem_male.
A positive height at zero indicates that applicants with higher observables in the rst group
has lower admission probabilities than the second.
Clearly, the rst curve has signicant mass below zero and the dashed curve has almost no
mass below zero, suggesting a positive probability that p (Xmale;male) < p (Xfemale; female)
although Xmale " Xfemale. This evidence is still present in the right panel with independent
and state schools replacing male and female, respectively, but to a slightly lesser extent,
suggesting that indep may be only slightly larger than state. To perform the test formally,
in table 3, we report ^0n (0:95), the upper limit of a one-sided condence interval, calculated
using the method of CLR, as explained in Section 5. We report results for " = 0:1 (recall
that we concluded dominance even with " = 0, c.f., g. 2). A negative upper limit indicates
that the set SD (g; h; ") is nonempty and consequently we reject the null of g  h in
favour of g > h. It is evident from the rst four rows of table 3 that we reject emptiness
for g = male, h = female and for g = indep, h = state but do not reject emptiness in the
other cases. This suggests that males and private school applicants face higher admission
thresholds. The exact upper limits of condence intervals reported above vary slightly across
functional specications (e.g., whether higher order terms and interactions in the test scores
are or are not used to estimate p (; )), but two empirical ndings are robust across all
specications: (a) the gender gap is large, persistent and statistically signicant in every
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case,6 and (b) the independent-state school di¤erence is less persistent across specications
but is always negative. Given the evidence of a large gender-gap, we investigated it further
by breaking the data up by schooltype. Results reported in the last two rows of table 3 show
that the gender-gap is large within both state and private school categories, indicating that
male applicants are held to a higher standard for applicants from both state and private
school backgrounds.
Interpretation of the empirical ndings: It would be natural to conjecture that
the threshold di¤erences arise primarily from the implicit or explicit practice of a¢ rmative
action, viz., the overweighting of outcomes for historically disadvantaged groups. A second
possibility is that, in face of political and/or media pressure, admission tutors try to equate an
application success rate for, say, males with one for females, which is also consistent with our
empirical ndings (see Tables 1 and 2). This would make the e¤ective male threshold higher
if, say, the conditional male outcome distribution has a thicker right tail. A third possibility is
that female applicants are set a lower admission threshold in order to encourage more female
candidates to apply in future. Note from Table 1 that the number of female applications
is nearly half the number of male ones. Regardless of what the underlying determinants
of the tutorsbehavior are, we can conclude from our analysis that the admission practice
under study deviates from the outcome-oriented benchmark and makes male and independent
school applicants face signicantly higher admission thresholds.
In order to gain some further insight into how the threshold discrepancies arise, we plot
the empirical C.D.F.s of predicted academic performance based on the observable characteris-
tics. This is done by regressing rst-year and then nal year examination scores in university
on gcsescore, aptitude test and essay score, interview grades and gender/schooltype for en-
6As noted by a referee, this nding is somewhat curious, given that girls routinely out-
perform boys in the majority of high school and college tests across the world, including the
PISA assessments, c.f. Goldin, et al, 2006 and Niederle and Vesterlund, 2010. Indeed in our
data, the performance of the average (as opposed to marginal) female admit is also lower than
that of the average male admit, although this has nothing to do with admission-thresholds
and fair admission, per se.
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rolled students. The regression output appears in table 4. The estimated CDFs of predicted
performance by gender and schooltype are plotted in Figure 3B.
It is clear that in both graphs, the male distribution rst-order stochastic dominates
the female distribution. This means that if admissions were determined solely by predicted
performance based on observables (i.e., there is no unobserved heterogeneity), any common
acceptance rate across gender will result in a higher predicted outcome for the marginal
accepted male than the marginal accepted female. The dominance is less pronounced in
the case of school-type, since female independent school candidates appear to face a lower
threshold than male state-school candidates. Our results in Table 3 imply that allowing
for unobserved heterogeneity does not change this scenario substantively, and suggests that
equating the application success-rates (see table 1) leads to the use of higher admission
thresholds for male and, to a lesser extent, for private school candidates. Indeed, if admission-
o¢ cers believe that eventual exam performance is not the relevant measure of merit, then one
needs to repeat the analysis with whichever performance measure "meritocracy" is dened
with respect to. Taking the attainment of at least a 2.1, i.e., a "high second class" mark
of 64% a minimum requirement for entry into most postgraduate programmes as the
relevant outcome produces a very similar result, presented in Fig. 6.
At this point, it is worth considering whether our ndings could be consistent with two
other alternative explanations, as follows.
G-blind admissions: The rst possibility is where admission tutors ignore G completely
in forming their assessment and use a common admission cut-o¤across G, thereby generating
insignicant e¤ects of gender and school-type on admission probabilities, both uncondition-
ally (c.f. Table 1) and conditionally on past test-scores (c.f. Table 2). Such behavior could
arise either from an institutional norm banning any conditioning on demographic character-
istics, or from the tutorsbelief that such characteristics have no explanatory power beyond
the pre-admission test scores. Therefore, the question is whether by including G in our
analysis, we are detecting threshold di¤erences that are not "intentional". Even if that were
the case, we would argue that in order for admissions to be meritocratic, admission tutors
should take G into account. For example, suppose G denotes a school type, state-school stu-
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dents are more able than independent school students with the same test score, and therefore
perform better in post-admission exams. If tutors ignore G, then an independent and a state
school student with identical pre-admission test scores will have equal probability of admis-
sion, even though the state-school student is more meritorious, which would contradict the
notion of meritocratic admissions.
Biased interviews score: A second issue concerns the use of interview scores in cal-
culating the lower bounds. Suppose that tutors are biased in favour of type-g applicants
and award them higher interview marks (relative to true performance) than type h. But as
we saw in Figure 1, the interview score does appear to satisfy Assumption M (with " = 0),
which would be unlikely if one type of candidates was systematically awarded higher inter-
view scores relative to their performance in the other more "objective" tests. For example for
g = male and h = female, if males are awarded systematically higher interview scores, then
we would expect to see a signicant mass in the negative orthant of the top right histogram
in Figure 1, which is clearly not the case.
6.2 Some Robustness Checks
Biased test-scores: One feature of our approach is that we are taking the pre-admission test
scores as true indicators of academic merit. However, students from privileged backgrounds
might perform well in these tests simply on account of having being coached extensively. It is
not possible to conduct any analysis of meritocracy if no previous measure of achievement can
be taken to be accurate. As mentioned above, post-admission performance is not observed
for non-admitted candidates, and thus cannot be incorporated in the analysis without strong
assumptions. Therefore, it is important to examine whether our substantive conclusions are
a¤ected if we use "contextualized", i.e., standardized scores within each demographic group
as an alternative measure of merit. Accordingly, we repeat the above analysis by replacing
each test-score by its standardized version and invoking assumption CM, above. Recall
the condition Xmale  Xfemale which refers to those male-female pairs where the males
have higher relative scores than females. Then we can conclude that group g faces a higher
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threshold than group h if 0 < 0, where
0  inf
(xg ;xh)2XgXh; xgxh

x0g0;g   x0h0;h

.
The results from this exercise are shown in Table 3, in the last column titled "Standardized
Scores" corresponding to  = 1:25 (the smallest  for which histograms analogous to those
in Figure 1, above, have positive support). As before, a negative upper limit of the CLR
condence interval indicates that group g faces a higher threshold than group h, since some
group g members with high relative test-scores have a lower probability of admission than
some group h members with lower relative test-scores. As is apparent from Table 3, last
column, it still remains the case that male applicants face a higher admission-threshold than
female candidates. However, the test for a threshold di¤erence between independent and
private school students now becomes inconclusive. This conrms the previous substantive
nding that threshold di¤erences by schooltype are insignicant, but the gender di¤erences
are pronounced.
First-stage Selection: In principle, we can repeat our analysis to test meritocracy in
the rst stage selection process, as well. However, the rst stage selection in our empirical
context is based entirely on the ranking in the aptitude test-scores; there is e¤ectively no
selection on unobservables at this stage. In particular, all applicants are classied into bands
by their overall aptitude test score. Then private school students in approximately the
top half and state school students in the top two-third are interviewed. Figure 5 presents
suggestive evidence regarding rst-stage selection of candidates. The left panel plots the
CDF of aptitude test scores for those making it to the interview stage. The right graph
plots the CDF of predicted interview scores based on the aptitude test score (analogous to
Figure 3 for the second stage of selection). A common success rate for entry to the interview
stage would imply a lower threshold for female and state school candidates, but with male
state school candidates facing a higher threshold than female independent school candidates.
Thus, in fact, one sees a very similar overall picture as in the second stage selection (see Fig.
3).
Choice of ": Finally, in Figure 7, we plot the upper limits of the CLR condence
intervals across a range of " for both the overall gender-gap as well as the gender gap within
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each school-type. The persistence of the negative upper limits in Figure 7 reinforces the
conclusion that female candidates face lower thresholds than males both on average and
within each type of school-background.
6.3 Caveats
Several caveats apply to our methods and data. The rst is that we ignore peer-e¤ects, both
at the individual level and also at the institutional level. For example, it is possible that an
applicant is admitted (or rejected) because he/she is deemed to have the potential to create
positive (negative) externalities on his/her peersperformance. But it seems unlikely to us
that admission tutors can be condent enough in predicting peer-e¤ects for this consideration
to play a signicant role in admissions. Nonetheless, there remains a possibility that some
students get admitted simply because they come from demographic groups that "t better"
with the institution, although their test-scores might be lower. Indeed, if future academic
performance is an index of that t, then gures 3 and 6 do not support these possibilities.
But of course, the t may be judged with respect to other indices, and thus this caveat
remains.
The second caveat pertains to the data we use. In reality, di¤erent applicants in our
context are assessed by di¤erent tutors, each assessing a set of applications. But there
is signicant reallocation of les across tutors to ensure that meritorious candidates are
not excluded simply because the tutor assessing their les happened to have assessed a
disproportionately large number of strong applicants. However, the reallocation of les need
not be perfectly managed. Therefore, our test should be viewed as one of meritocratic
admission at the level of the university "as a whole", and deviations from it should be
interpreted as having arisen from a variety of possible sources including explicit a¢ rmative
action, ine¢ cient reallocation of les, and systematically incorrect beliefs of tutors.
A third possibility is that in other contexts (notably in the US), it has been found that
female students perform better in college exams than males with the same pre-admission
test-scores. If that were true, admission o¢ cers may admit female applicants who have
scored relatively lower on pre-admission assessments. This is unlikely to be the case in
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our application; indeed, Fig 3A shows that post-entry college performance of males rst-
order stochastic dominates that of females, which is inconsistent with the superior female
performance explanation. Moreover, Fig 3B shows that predicted college performance on the
basis of observables is also stochastically higher for males, which provides further evidence
against that explanation. However, when applying our methods to other contexts, it would
be advisable to draw graphs analogous to Fig 3A and 3B as a preliminary check.
7 Summary and Conclusion
This paper has proposed an empirical approach to testing, on the basis of micro-data, whether
an existing admission protocol is meritocratic, when a researcher observes some but not all
applicant-specic information observed by admission tutors. The approach works by dening
meritocratic admissions through a threshold-crossing model and then using admission data
to learn the sign of the di¤erence in admission thresholds for di¤erent demographic groups.
These quantities are robust to the unobserved characteristics problem, under an intuitive
assumption about the ranking of applicants by unobservable attributes. Applying our meth-
ods to admissions data for a selective UK university, we nd that admission thresholds faced
by male applicants are signicantly higher than females while those for private-school appli-
cants possibly slightly higher than for state school applicants. In contrast, average admission
rates are nearly identical across gender and across school-type. These conclusions hold up
to a large variety of robustness checks, as described in Section 6.3. Beyond the application
to college-admissions, our methods are potentially useful for testing fairness of other binary
decisions such as loan-approval, surgery-referrals etc., where allegations of bias are common.
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Table 0: Variable-Label     
gcsescore Overall score in GCSE, 0-4 
alevelscore Average A-level scores 80-120 
aptitude test Overall score in Aptitude Test 0-100 
essay Score on Substantive Essay 0-100 
Interview Performance score in interview 0-100 
prelim_avg Average score in first year university exam; 0-100 
offer Whether offered admission 
Note: The gcsescore is an average of the GCSE grades achieved by the candidate for eight subjects, where A* = 4, A = 3, B = 2, C = 1, D or below 
=0. The grades used are mathematics plus the other seven best grades. The alevelscore is an average of the A-levels achieved by or predicted for the 
candidate by his/her school, excluding general studies. Scores are calculated on the scale A=120, A/B = 113, B/A = 107, B = 100, C = 80, D = 60, E = 
40, as per England-wide UCAS norm. 
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Table 1: Means by Gender and by Schooltype 
Variable Female (N=241) Male (N=394) pvalue_diff State (N=355) Indep (N=280) pvalue_diff 
gcsescore 3.79 3.72 0 3.67 3.85 0 
alevelscore 119.73 119.59 0.01 119.60 119.73 0.02 
aptitude test 62.02 65.09 0 63.16 64.85 0.0015 
essay 61.77 63.38 0 62.98 64.42 0.5 
interview 63.74 64.69 0.04 64.24 64.43 0.65 
prelim_avg 61.02 62.33 0.04 61.83 61.83 0.03 
offer 0.33 0.37 0.14 0.34 0.35 0.24 
accept 0.33 0.37 0.5 0.34 0.35 0.46 
Note: The data pertain to two cohorts of applicants. The variable names are explained in table 0. Columns 3 and 6 record the p-value 
corresponding to a test of equal means against a one-sided alternative. Differences in unconditional offer rates across school-types (highlighted) 
are seen to be statistically indistinguishable from zero at 5%.  
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Table 2: Probit Regression of Admission 
 
 
Variable Coef. Coef/std.err
Marginal 
Effect Marg.Eff/Std.Err 
gcsescore 0.188 0.76 0.055 0.75 
interview 0.225 10.43 0.066 11.72 
aptitude test 0.087 6.99 0.026 6.76 
essay 0.007 0.59 0.002 0.59 
male -0.210 -1.33 0.062 -1.31 
independent -0.129 -0.84 0.037 -0.84 
     
 
 
   
 
Note: Probit regression of eventual admission for all UK-based applicants, together 
with two-sided p-value; the highlighted fields show insignificant effect of gender and 
school background on admission probabilities, controlling for aptitude test-scores. Data 
pertain to two cohorts of UK-based applicants. Marginal effects are calculated at mean 
values of covariates and for moving from 0 to 1 for male and independent. Gender and 
schooltype remain insignificant (highlighted in yellow) even after controlling for past 
test-scores. 
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               Figure 1: Evidence of Median Dominance 
 
 
 
 
Note: Histogram of differences in predicted median interview score across pairs of 
candidates where the first has scored higher than the second in terms of each of 
GCSE score, aptitude test, and essay. For example, the histogram in the top left 
panel shows the estimated marginal distribution of the variable: Median[interview | 
Xmale,G=male]-Median[interview | Xfemale,G=female] across all paired 
realizations (Xmale,Xfemale) satisfying Xmale≽Xfemale. 
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Figure 2: Graphical evidence of different admission thresholds 
 
 
 
Note: The above graphs plot the marginal C.D.F. of the difference in admission probabilities p(Xg,g)-p(Xh,h) for 
pairs of (Xg,Xh) satisfying Xg൐ε	Xh for ε=0.1 for various combinations of g and h. A positive height at zero 
indicates that applicants with higher observables in the first group (g) have lower admission probabilities than those 
with lower observables in the second group (h). The solid curve on the left panel shows, for example, that a 
subgroup of males with higher observables have lower admission probability than a subgroup of females with lower 
observables. 
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Table 3: Testing Unequal Thresholds  
Difference ε=0.1 ε=0.25 
Quadratics in Pre-
Admission Scores 
ε=0.1 
Standardized 
scores δ=1.5 
g=male, h=female -1.73 -2.02 -3.49 -2.01 
g=female, h=male 0.57 0.67 0.684 0.43 
g=indep, h=state -1.29 -0.58 -2.75 0.012 
g=state, h=indep 0.92 0.04 0.635 1.87 
g=state_male, h=state_female -1.36 -1.01 -6.85 -1.19 
g=indep_male,h=indep_female -1.11 -3.39 -2.7 -3.56 
 
Note: This table reports the upper limit of the one-sided 95% Confidence Interval for testing whether group g is 
facing a higher admission threshold than group h, with a negative upper limit indicating that it is. The first two 
columns with ε=0.1 and ε=0.25 correspond to evaluating difference in admission probability (as a function of 
gcsescore, aptitude test score, essay score and interview score) between a g-type and an h-type applicant where 
the former has scored ε standard deviations higher on each of the raw pre-entry performance measures, and the 
final column corresponds to the case where the former has scored 1.5 points or higher on standardized Z-score 
versions of them, as explained in the text in sections 8.2 and 8.5, respectively. The last-but-one column shows the 
results when qudratics and second-order interactions between all pre-admission performance measures are used as 
additional controls, beyond the linear versions of them, to predict admission probabilities, as a robustness check. 
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Table 4: Regression of first year performance on observable covariates 
  
  Coefficient Std error t-value 
gcsescore 3.33 1.77 1.88 
aptitude test 0.19 0.04 4.31 
essay -0.004 0.047 -0.08 
interview 0.06 0.03 1.78 
male 1.14 0.69 1.66 
indep 0.41 0.68 0.75 
Note: Regression of admitted candidates' performance in first year examinations on pre-admission test 
scores, interview score, gender and school-type. Highlighted fields show significant positive impact of 
being male but insignificant effect of being from private-school on subsequent performance, conditional on 
admission. 
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 Figure 3A: CDF of first year (prelim) and third year (final) performance, by gender 
 
Note: CDF of first-year (left panel) and final year (right panel) performance in college for 
admitted candidates. The male CDFs are seen to lie almost entirely to the right of the female 
CDFs, with dominance more pronounced for prelims. 
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Figure 3B: CDF of predicted first year (prelim) and third year (final) performance based 
on observables, by gender and school-type 
 
Note: CDF of predicted first-year (left panel) and final year (right panel) performance in 
college for admitted candidates, based on observable GCSE score, interview performance and 
aptitude test scores. The male CDFs are seen to lie almost entirely to the right of the female 
CDFs, implying that a common admission rate would imply that marginal male entrants will 
have significantly higher expected score on first and final year exams. 
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Figure 4: Testing Monotonicity of Median Interview Score in “Contextualised” Test-scores 
 
 
 
Note: The above graphs plot histograms of the difference in admission probabilities 
p(Xmale,male) - p(Xfemale, female) for pairs of (Xmale, Xfemale) satisfying 
Xmale൐Xfemale+ δ, for δ =1.0 and δ =1.25, where Xmale, Xfemale are the standardized 
test-scores observed prior to admissions. The smallest δ for which these histograms have 
positive support is δ =1.25. We use this value of δ to do our robustness checks, as 
explained in the paper in Section 8.3. 
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Figure 5: First-stage Selection 
 
 
Note: The above graphs present suggestive evidence regarding first-stage selection of candidates. The left panel 
plots the CDF of the raw aptitude test-scores for those making it to the interview stage. The right graph plots the 
CDF of predicted interview scores based on aptitude test score and GCSE score, and is analogous to Figure 3 
above which pertains to the second stage of selection. A common success rate across gender and schooltype for 
entry to the interview stage would imply a lower threshold for female and state school candidates, but with male 
state school candidates facing a higher threshold than female independent school candidates. 
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Figure 6: Predicted Probability of attaining a 2.1 level mark 
 
 
Note: The above graph plots the CDF of the predicted probability of getting at least a high 
second class level mark (64%) in the first year exams, based on aptitude test score, 
interview score and GCSE score. The horizontal axis marks the probability of getting at 
least a 2.1, and the vertical axis is the admission probability. A common success rate for 
entry would imply a lower threshold for female and state school candidates, but with male 
state school candidates facing a higher threshold than female independent school 
candidates. For instance, a 30% success rate across schooltype and gender would imply 
that about 63% of female candidates from state-schools and about 75% of male private-
school candidates would get at least a 2.1 degree in expectation. This figure is a robustness 
check on Figure 3, above. 
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 Figure 7: Effect of ε on gender-gap in admission thresholds 
 
Note: In this figure, we examine how the overall male-female gap in thresholds 
differs by school-type, and also how the results are affected by one’s choice of ε. 
We plot upper limits of 95% CLR confidence intervals, with a negative upper 
limit implying that the first group faces a higher threshold than the second. These 
limits are plotted across a range of ε. 
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